Key Points on the Israel-Hezbollah War - Democratic Majority for Israel

March 25, 2026

Hezbollah is an Iranian-backed Shia terrorist organization formed in 1982 with support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Since its inception, Hezbollah has been an agent of Iran, receiving funding, direction, and other support from the IRGC that has enabled it to hollow out the Lebanese state, exploit its population, and drag the country into a catastrophic war in service of Tehran’s agenda.

Hezbollah has American blood on its hands. It is responsible for some of the deadliest terrorist attacks against the United States, including the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 American servicemembers, as well as attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel.

Hezbollah attacked northern Israel with rockets on October 8th, 2023, one day after Hamas’s massacre of 1,200 Israelis and before Israeli troops had entered Gaza. This was a deliberate act of aggression ordered by Iran, which uses Hezbollah to execute its regional military strategy.

Hezbollah’s attacks have repeatedly targeted civilian communities. Its rocket and missile barrages into northern Israel have displaced 60,000+ Israeli civilians from their homes in the north, and a Hezbollah rocket strike in 2024 killed 12 Druze children in the Golan Heights.

A ceasefire brokered by President Biden in November 2024 helped reduce cross-border violence until earlier this month, when Hezbollah resumed and escalated its attacks against Israel at Iran’s behest.

In addition to its military wing, Hezbollah wields influence as a political party in the Lebanese Government and seeks to shape policy in line with Iran’s regional agenda, often undermining Lebanese sovereignty and state institutions. This includes blocking efforts to assert control in southern Lebanon, diverting resources to its own military network, and constraining civilian governance.

However, dynamics within Lebanon began to shift following the election of a new president in January 2025, Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Chief Joseph Aoun. Under the terms of the 2024 ceasefire agreement, President Aoun pledged to disarm Hezbollah, and the LAF conducted initial operations against the group’s warehouses and military positions; but it did not confront the group directly.

Earlier this month, the Lebanese government condemned the group, outlawed its activities, and arrested several militants it accused of illegal possession of weapons. Lebanon has also recently expelled Iran’s ambassador and declared him persona non grata; and President Aoun offered to hold direct negotiations with Israel for the first time since 1982 but said the fighting must end first.

Following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran beginning in late February 2026, Hezbollah launched renewed and expanded attacks on Israel. With these strikes, Hezbollah made it clear that it is waging an Iranian proxy war on Lebanese soil and at the expense of Lebanese civilians.

Hezbollah is conducting a sustained military campaign against Israeli civilians, sending an average of at least 100 rockets and drones a day against Israel, capable of striking deep into Israeli population centers and threatening critical infrastructure.

Israeli airstrikes are targeting Hezbollah’s military infrastructure across Lebanon, and IDF ground forces are reportedly operating in southern Lebanon to root out elements of Hezbollah.

As part of its operations, Israel has taken steps to reduce civilian harm, including issuing advance warnings and facilitating the movement of Lebanese civilians out of areas of active fighting where Hezbollah operates and has embedded military infrastructure.

Israel’s objectives are clear, legitimate, and consistent with the right of any democratic government to protect its citizens: degrade Hezbollah’s military capabilities, restore security to the northern border, and allow displaced civilians on both sides of the border to return home.

Since October 7^th, Israel has inflicted significant cumulative damage on Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Israel has degraded Hezbollah’s rocket and missile launch infrastructure, disrupted its command and control, and eliminated senior commanders and operatives. These operations have weakened Hezbollah but have not yet eliminated the threat, particularly given the scale of its arsenal and the extent of Iranian support.

Responsibility for any civilian harm in Lebanon lies with Hezbollah’s deliberate strategy of embedding military infrastructure in civilian areas, including the storage of weapons in homes, schools, and hospitals. That strategy is a war crime, designed to either deter Israeli action or generate images of civilian casualties when Israel acts.

UNSCR 1701 is the multilateral agreement that ended the 2006 war and required Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River. Hezbollah has never complied with that requirement, and UNIFIL, the LAF, and the broader international community failed to enforce it for nearly two decades.

The current war is in significant part a consequence of the international community’s unwillingness to enforce its own commitments. Israel cannot be asked to accept another unenforceable agreement; any future arrangement must include credible, binding enforcement mechanisms with real consequences for violations.

Hezbollah must immediately cease all attacks on Israel and withdraw from the border region in compliance with UNSCR 1701. The Lebanese government, with international support if necessary, must extend state authority over southern Lebanon.

The U.S. should lead a diplomatic effort with allies to secure a binding and verifiable agreement that ensures Hezbollah’s withdrawal north of the Litani River, the safe return of displaced citizens on both sides of the border, and robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms with clear consequences for violations.

The U.S. and allies should also increase coordinated economic and political pressure on Hezbollah and its Iranian backers, including the expansion and enforcement of sanctions targeting Hezbollah’s financing, procurement, and global criminal networks; closing any gaps in international terrorist designations that distinguish between Hezbollah’s “political” and “military” wings; and strengthening multilateral efforts to disrupt the group’s illicit finance mechanisms.

The U.S. should support Israel’s right to defend its citizens while continuing to emphasize adherence to international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians. Any arrangement to establish an IDF security zone south of the Litani River should be limited in scope and duration and tied to a broader diplomatic effort to restore full Lebanese sovereignty. The U.S. should also increase support for the LAF and legitimate state institutions and support Lebanese leaders and civil society pushing back against the group.

Members who have questions about U.S. operational involvement in the Iran strikes can and should raise those concerns through appropriate oversight channels, but those questions are separate from the broader principle that Israel has the right to defend its citizens against a sustained Iranian proxy assault, and the U.S. has both a strategic and moral interest in helping bring it to an end through diplomacy backed by pressure.