April 13, 2026
U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Israel is based on a negotiated agreement between democratically elected governments and, like any such agreement, is subject to future negotiation by those governments. The current Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and Israel expires at the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2028. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told The Economist in January that he wants to “taper off military aid within the next 10 years.” Any proposals to phase out FMF should be considered carefully, with adequate planning, ensuring Israel’s security needs and U.S. interests are upheld in a gradual transition.
Critics of U.S. security assistance to Israel have proposed ending FMF abruptly once the current MOU expires, while continuing to allow arms sales paid for by Israel. They argue this would “normalize” the relationship and treat Israel like other advanced allies. While this framing sounds reasonable, it oversimplifies how FMF actually works and what the United States gets from it.
On proposals to end FMF:
- FMF is not a blank check. It is a structured framework that embeds the U.S. in Israeli defense planning, procurement, and coordination. Commercial sales are transactional. FMF is relational. Replacing one with the other means the U.S. still sells weapons but with far less influence over how Israel uses them.
- FMF carries built-in oversight, conditions, and coordination that commercial sales don’t replicate. Ending it doesn’t just change who pays. It changes the nature of the partnership.
- Israel’s defense spending hit nearly 9 percent of GDP in 2024, second only to Ukraine. War costs since October 2023 are estimated at $80 billion.
- GDP comparisons to the UK or Japan ignore reality. No other wealthy U.S. ally faces a nuclear-aspirant adversary committed to its destruction, a coordinated regional proxy network, and sustained multi-front combat all at once.
- Israel is the only major U.S. security partner with no American troops on its soil. Germany, Japan, and South Korea host tens of thousands of U.S. service members at a cost of billions annually. The U.S. investment in Israel’s defense is a fraction of what we spend elsewhere. “Treating Israel like other allies” would cost more, not less.
- FMF dollars are largely spent in the United States, supporting American defense jobs, manufacturing, and supply chains. By FY2028, 100 percent must be spent domestically. Commercial sales carry no such guarantee. Israel could shift procurement to other countries, weakening the U.S. defense industrial base.
- FMF is part of a regional architecture that includes aid to Egypt (~$1.4B/year) and Jordan (~$1.45B/year), rooted in their peace treaties with Israel. No one is proposing to end that aid on fiscal grounds. Singling out Israel sends a destabilizing signal.
On conditioning aid and blocking transfers:
- Congress already has tools to enforce U.S. law, review specific sales, and conduct oversight. Those tools should be used, consistently, for all recipients.
- But calibrating specific systems through existing mechanisms is fundamentally different from dismantling the FMF framework. Collapsing the two into one debate is a false binary.
- Geographic restrictions on weapons use or rigid “offensive vs. defensive” categories are operationally unworkable. Threats don’t respect borders.
- Engagement gives the U.S. leverage. Disengagement gives us nothing.
- A more effective approach combines sustained engagement with clear expectations, consistent oversight, and a willingness to act when standards are not met.
- Engagement rather than withdrawal is what actually gives us leverage to press for better conduct in real time.
On missile defense (Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow):
- Some argue Israel should buy these systems commercially. But missile defense resupply during active conflict requires rapid, predictable pipelines. FMF ensures that. Commercial purchases introduce delays and budget uncertainty at the moments these systems matter most.
- They protect millions of people—including Jews, Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Americans living in Israel—and reduce the immediate pressure for escalation.
- Supporting these systems is consistent with the goal of reducing civilian harm. When incoming fire is intercepted, there is less pressure for large-scale retaliatory responses.
- However, at least some of the $500 million in missile defense funding must be maintained going forward, especially for ballistic missile defense, because the Israelis cannot buy systems that only they make.
- These systems protect millions of civilians of all faiths, including thousands of Americans, from rockets and missiles. They have saved countless lives since October 7th. There is no defensible case for defunding purely defensive weapons during an active war.
- These are joint U.S.-Israel programs. The U.S. benefits directly from the technology, battlefield data, and operational insights they generate, strengthening American missile defense worldwide.
- When incoming fire is intercepted, the pressure for retaliatory strikes decreases. Funding missile defense actively reduces civilian harm on all sides.
On the broader strategic context:
- The U.S. has managed disagreements with Israeli governments before. The effective model pairs security assistance with diplomacy, clear expectations, and private pressure. It works because the U.S. is at the table, not threatening to leave.
- Ending FMF while continuing sales may sound moderate. In practice, it downgrades an integrated security partnership into a transactional arms-dealer relationship. That is a significant loss of influence dressed up as fiscal responsibility.
- Allies and adversaries are watching. Walking away from a decades-long commitment to a democratic partner during a regional war tells every capital in the world that American commitments are conditional.