May 5, 2026
Key Points
- U.S. security assistance to Israel is in America’s national security interest; it relies primarily on strengthening Israel’s defensive capacity rather than a large, permanent U.S. troop presence based in Israel.
- The United States supports allies worldwide through a combination of forward-deployed forces under mutual defense treaties and security assistance; in Europe and Asia, troops and bases are the primary tool, while in Israel assistance has played that role.
- U.S. security assistance to Israel is modest relative to overall defense spending—approximately $3.8 billion annually, well under one percent of the U.S. defense budget; and it helps the United States avoid the need for direct military involvement.
- Israel is currently engaged in an active, multi-front conflict against Iran and its proxies, including Hamas and Hezbollah, a threat environment unlike that faced by U.S. allies in Europe or Asia.
- Allies like the United Kingdom and Japan produce most of their own defense systems domestically; Israel relies more on buying key platforms from allies. This makes predictable access to U.S. defense articles especially important during periods of active conflict and underscores why abrupt restrictions would weaken Israel’s operational capacity and embolden its adversaries.
Since the Clinton Administration, U.S. security assistance to Israel has been structured through successive MOUs that have evolved over time through bilateral negotiation, including the phase-out of economic assistance and a corresponding increase in military support. While Prime Minister Netanyahu has indicated that Israel may seek to phase out U.S. security assistance over a future MOU period extending toward 2038, the details of any such agreement remain subject to negotiation between the United States and Israel.
Recent calls to terminate U.S. security assistance to Israel on the grounds of its strong GDP are based on a flawed premise and risk undermining U.S. national security interests. A more relevant comparison is how the United States chooses to meet its security objectives: through the deployment of American forces or by building a partner’s capacity to defend itself.
In Europe and East Asia, the United States deters adversaries and defends allies primarily through forward-deployed military power under mutual defense treaties. Tens of thousands of U.S. troops are stationed in allied countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and others, supported by extensive basing infrastructure, prepositioned equipment, and integrated command structures. These forward deployments enable rapid response, strengthen deterrence, and represent a substantial, ongoing U.S. investment in allied defense, often at significantly greater cost than security assistance provided to Israel. These deployments are backed by formal mutual defense treaties, including NATO and bilateral treaties with Japan and South Korea, that commit the United States to their defense.
For example, the United States stations about 28,000 troops on the Korean Peninsula and approximately 50,000 personnel in Japan, forming a central pillar of U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific. Financial contributions from allies like Japan and South Korea help defray certain expenses of hosting U.S. forces, but they do not cover the full cost of maintaining a forward-deployed military presence, nor do they change the underlying strategic model of projecting U.S. power and deterring adversaries across the region.
Major U.S. defense treaty allies also maintain robust, self-sustaining defense industrial bases capable of producing a wide range of advanced military systems domestically. While Israel has a highly advanced and innovative defense sector, it remains more reliant on external procurement, especially from the United States, for key platforms, munitions, and components, which is especially important to maintain readiness during periods of active conflict. U.S. security assistance helps provide predictable, timely access to these capabilities through established acquisition channels and long-term funding frameworks. This predictability supports planning on both sides, enabling Israel’s readiness while giving the U.S. defense industrial base stability to plan and scale production.
In Israel, U.S. policy has historically emphasized partner capacity rather than a large, permanent U.S. troop presence under a mutual defense treaty. This approach reflects both operational realities and strategic design, ensuring Israel has the capability to respond immediately and independently to threats while avoiding the need for a standing U.S. combat presence. Security assistance, especially missile defense, serves as the primary mechanism for enabling Israeli deterrence and regional stability.
Israel’s security environment further underscores this approach, as it faces sustained threats from Iran and its proxies, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. Since Hamas’s attack on October 7, Israel has been engaged in an active, multi-front conflict, relying on defensive systems to intercept rockets, missiles, and drones targeting civilian population centers. There is no U.S. treaty ally in Europe or Asia currently facing sustained, daily attacks from adversaries committed to their destruction while being asked to forgo defensive support.
Arguments that Israel can simply “afford” to replace U.S. assistance overlook current economic realities. Wartime conditions, including large-scale reserve mobilization, increased defense spending, and broader economic disruption, place significant strain on Israel’s economy that topline GDP figures do not capture.
Israel is a critical partner in countering shared threats, particularly from Iran and its network of proxies. Intelligence sharing, joint capabilities development, and operational coordination provide direct benefits to U.S. national security. Supporting Israel’s qualitative military edge strengthens deterrence, limits escalation, and reduces the likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement. Much of this assistance is spent in the United States, supporting tens of thousands of American jobs and the defense industrial base.
Finally, proposals to restrict assistance do not present a viable alternative. There is no substantial U.S. force posture in Israel today that could offset reduced support, nor any mutual defense treaty binding the United States to Israel’s defense. There is also no indication that Israel’s adversaries would respond with restraint. The more likely outcome would be emboldened aggression against Israel, increased instability in the region, and a higher risk of U.S. involvement under less favorable conditions.